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Abstract 
 
  I use the introduction of a competitive fellowship program for graduate 
students to test whether men and women respond differently to competition and 
whether this response depends on the gender mix of the group. Men experienced a 
10% increase in performance in response to the program, with the largest gains 
for men in departments with the most female students. Women did not increase 
performance, on average, but the response of women did differ greatly depending 
on the gender mix of their peers, with a more positive response when a larger 
fraction of the group was female. 
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 A very small fraction of the top positions in both the private and academic sectors 
are occupied by women. For example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that only 2.5% 
of the five highest paid executives in a large set of US firms are women. Several 
explanations have been provided for the under-representation of women in top positions. 
These include occupational self-selection, discrimination in hiring and promotion, and 
lack of long-term commitment to the workforce.1 An additional explanation, based on the 
experimental findings of several recent studies, is that men and women respond 
differently to competition and that this response to competition depends on the gender 
mix of the group.  
 The purpose of this paper is to extend these experimental results to a real life 
setting where the subjects are humanities graduate students at a set of highly ranked 
academic institutions. In 1991, the Mellon Foundation instituted the Graduate Education 
Initiative (GEI), with the explicit goal of providing funding on a competitive basis to 
students to encourage them to make quick progress towards completing their doctorate. 
The GEI provided $58 million to 54 departments over a ten year period. The majority of 
the money was used by the departments to provide fellowships to students after they 
achieved certain hurdles, the first being advancement to candidacy. The individual 
departments decided which students to award the money to but the stated intent of the 
program was for the money to go to the students who made the quickest progress towards 
completing their degree. 
                                                 
1
 Blau and Kahn (2000) provide a review of the larger issue of the gender wage gap.  Studies providing 
evidence for the explanations mentioned above include Polachek (1981) for occupational self-selection; 
Neumark (1996) for discrimination in hiring; and Cobb-Clark and Dunlop (1999) for discrimination in 
promotions.  
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 In the first few years of the GEI, the allocation of awards gave every appearance 
of being both very competitive (only 8% of students got the award) and very rewarding 
(recipients of the award experienced a 64% increase in their stipend). Ultimately the 
departments participating in the GEI did not allocate funds on a competitive basis, since 
most students eventually received an award (76% of those who advanced to candidacy) 
and those who received the award early on did not receive more overall compensation 
than students who got the award latter in their studies. However, what is important for 
this analysis is that at least for a few cohorts of entering students, the GEI created the 
impression of being a very competitive program. 
 I use the introduction of this competitive fellowship program to test whether 
increasing within group competition affects men and women differently. While the 
setting does not provide any exogenous variation in the gender mix of each cohort, I do 
test whether the response to competition varies by the gender mix of one’s peers. As an 
additional extension, I also test whether the response differs based on the marital status of 
the student. 
 
Gender and Competition  
 The use of competition as an incentive mechanism to increase performance has 
entered into many educational settings in the form of merit-aid or other rewards that are 
determined based on a student’s performance relative to his or her peers. Nalbantian and 
Schotter (1997) find that within a firm, introducing inter-group competition is generally 
one of the cheapest ways to increase overall performance. Several recent papers, 
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however, show that the response to competition may differ between men and women and 
that this response to competition may also depend on the gender mix of the group. 
 All of these recent papers are based on experimental settings in which participants 
compete in various tasks such as taking a difficult test (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev 2000), 
solving mazes (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003), running a foot race (Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2004), or answering trivia questions (Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh 
2004).  
The first question addressed in these papers was whether men and women 
responded differently to the introduction of competition. Gneezy, Niederle, and 
Rustichini (2003) answer this question using a series of experiments in which college 
students are paid to solve mazes. They introduce competition in their experiment by 
switching from a piece-rate payment system to a tournament setting where the student 
who solves the most mazes (within a group of 6 participants) is the only one that receives 
money. They find that men always respond positively to the introduction of competition 
but women only respond positively to competition in groups composed entirely of 
women. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) use running races of 9 and 10 year olds. In the 
first part of their experiment, each child runs alone. For the second race, students are 
paired based on their performance and raced again. Boys have large gains in performance 
when racing another child, especially if their competitor is a girl while girls experience 
no gain in performance when racing another student. 
The second question addressed in these papers is whether the performance of men 
and women in competitive environments depends on the gender mix of the group. 
Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh (2004) find that men are more likely to answer a 
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question correctly when a larger fraction of their competitors are women while women 
appear to be unaffected by the gender of their opponents. Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) 
carried out an experiment in which groups of three people take a difficult math and verbal 
test in the same room. The gender composition of the group is randomly assigned. The 
performance of men was not influenced by the gender mix of the group, but women did 
worse when a larger fraction of the group is male. As mentioned earlier, Gneezy, 
Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that women solve more mazes under a competitive 
pay-scheme when they are in groups with only women. 
 Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) provide various explanations for why 
men and women respond to competition differently and why the response is influenced 
by the gender mix of the group. One explanation for why women respond less to 
competition is that the cost or increasing the level of effort may be greater. Another 
reason is that women may not like to compete (or the non-monetary benefits of 
competing are smaller). Niederle and Versterlund (2005) show that when given a choice, 
women are less likely to opt into a competitive setting compared to men. This aversion to 
competition may the result of women not being socialized to compete as much as men. 
 As to the influence of the gender mix of one’s peers, if women believe (even if 
incorrectly) that men are better at the task, then a male and female student of equal ability 
may have different expectations about their relative ability to win the tournament. This 
expectation will affect the level of effort that they expend. There may also be 
evolutionary reasons why men are conditioned to “play harder” when more women are 
present. Some psychological explanations are that men may also face a higher 
psychological cost of “losing to a girl” while women may experience a stereotype threat 
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that adds to their level of stress and decreases their performance (Steele 1997). Stereotype 
threat occurs when individuals from a group with which there is a stereotype of being less 
able at a certain task are reminded of the possibility of confirming the stereotype. For 
example, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) find that high-achieving women do worse on 
standardized math tests when the stereotype associated with girls and math is mentioned. 
Also Ulku-Steiner, Kurtz-Costes, and Kinlaw (2000) find that female students in male 
dominated departments have lower levels of self confidence. 
 The next section describes a program implemented by the Andrew Mellon 
Foundation that provides an interesting test of how adult men and women respond 
differently to competition in an educational setting and how this response differs based 
on the gender mix of a student’s peers. An important thing to note is that all of the 
experimental studies were based on short-term responses to competition, whereas the 
program examined in this paper involved effort over an extended period of time. This 
type of extended competition is more relevant to the type of competitive schemes that are 
often devised for educational or workplace settings. 
 
Graduate Education Initiative  
 The Andrew Mellon Foundation implemented the Graduate Education Initiative 
(GEI) in 1991 with the express goals of improving graduate education in the humanities 
and related social sciences by increasing graduation rates and decreasing time to degree.  
The Mellon Foundation chose ten institutions to participate it GEI because they tended to 
enroll the largest number of winners of portable Mellon fellowship program that had been 
in existence for a number of years. These institutions then selected 4-6 departments to 
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participate in the GEI. The $58 million was allocated across these departments during the 
years 1991-2001. An additional 47 control departments were chosen after the program 
was implemented. Some of these departments were from the GEI institutions while other 
came from other universities. The control departments are not entirely comparable to the 
treatment departments but the analysis in this paper controls for the observable measures 
of each department such as field, institution, student quality (GRE scores) and the 
number of students in each entering cohort.2 
As part of their evaluation of the GEI, the Mellon Foundation collected data 
annually from both treatment and control departments on the funding (separately by 
tuition grant, fellowship, RA/TA funding, and Mellon awards) and progress of each 
student (including when they advanced to candidacy and when they either dropped out or 
graduated). The Mellon Foundation also collected information on student characteristics 
such as gender, race, citizenship, GRE math and verbal score, and whether the student 
had a master’s degree before starting graduate school. In 2003, the Mellon Foundation 
administered a survey to all of the students who had entered one of the treatment and 
control departments which provides the age and marital status of the student at the start 
and end of graduate school. 3 My sample includes the 9,664 students who entered one of 
the GEI or control departments between 1982 and 1995. Of these students, 7,321 
completed the survey (76% response rate). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 
variables included in the analysis of this paper separately for men and women. 
 This data provide the three essential pieces of information needed to identify the 
gender differential in the response to competition: (1) the timing of a shock to the level of 
                                                 
2
 A complete list of the institutions and departments that were used as treatment and control schools as was 
as a more complete description of the GEI program is found in Groen et al. (2005). 
3
 A more detailed description of the GEI survey is found in Ehrenberg et al. (2005). 
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competition, (2) the fraction of a student’s cohort that is female, and (3) a measure of 
student outcomes. The following sections briefly describe each of these measures. 
 
Shock to level of competition 
 The introduction of the GEI provides the exogenous source of competition for the 
analysis in this paper. The GEI was announced by the Mellon Foundation in March 1991. 
It was the Foundation’s intent that, “the departments will allocate the Foundation’s grants 
on a competitive basis to individual students making good progress towards their 
degree.”4 Students enrolled in Mellon departments were sent an explicit signal that the 
awards would be given on a competitive basis and that the primary criteria for these 
awards was that the student was making progress made towards one’s degree (with 
advancing to candidacy being the first milestone).  
 Table 2 shows the amount of funding received by students who first entered GEI 
departments between 1987 and 1988. These are students who enrolled in GEI 
departments before the program was announced and who could have been eligible for 
GEI awards in the first year of the program. The numbers in the left column are the 
amount of funding received in 1990 and 1991 by students who did not receive a GEI 
award in 1991, while the right column provides the same information for the 154 students 
who received a GEI award in 1991. While the two groups of students were getting 
roughly equivalent levels of funding in 1990, the students who received the award 
experienced a significant increase in funding. 
 The results in table 2 show that the implementation of the GEI in 1991 sent three 
signals to students in the participating departments. Getting an award would significantly 
                                                 
4
 Andrew W. Mellon Foundation press release on March 25, 1991. 
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increase your level of funding (on average $4,074 or a 64% increase), only a minor 
fraction of students were getting the awards (8.36% in the first year), and the awards 
were being given to students who advanced to candidacy the quickest (2.48 years 
compared to 2.98 years). It turns out that none of these initial impressions were true in the 
long run for the GEI program. Most students eventually got a Mellon award (76% of 
those who advanced to candidacy). Students who were the first to receive GEI awards 
received the same amount of money over the course of their studies as students who took 
longer to advance to candidacy. However, what is important for this analysis is that at 
least for a few cohorts of entering students, the GEI created the impression of being a 
very competitive program. 
 Thus the focus of this study is the set of students who entered graduate school 
between 1989 and 1990 (refereed to as majority-GEI). These students enrolled before the 
program was in place so there could have been no sorting with respect to a taste for 
competition. The students who entered graduate school between 1986 and 1988 (partial-
GEI) also fit this criteria but the majority of these students had already advanced to 
candidacy when the GEI was implemented, which would dilute the impact of the program 
on time to candidacy. Since the GEI awards were not to be given to students past their 
sixth year of enrollment, the entering cohorts of 1982-1985 (pre-GEI) were never eligible 
at any point for a GEI award. The primary analysis in this paper will be to compare the 
outcomes of the majority-GEI cohorts with the pre-GEI cohorts. 
   
Gender mix of entering cohort 
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 Slightly less than half of the students in the GEI sample are women. Table 3 
provides the average cohort size and distribution of the gender mix of each cohort by 
field. The variation in gender mix makes it possible to test the differential response to 
competition over a continuous range of the fraction of the group that is female. I interact 
the fraction of students in a cohort who are female with the other variables of interest to 
test whether male and female students respond to competition differently when more of 
their classmates are female. 
 
Time to Candidacy 
 The GEI was designed to provide fellowships to students who advanced to 
candidacy the quickest. As a result, the GEI created the highest levels of competition 
among students during the early years of graduate school. Using the time it takes students 
to advance to candidacy, therefore, provides a more direct test of the impact of 
competition than time to degree.  
 Table 4 provides the average time to candidacy, by gender, for both treatment and 
control departments. The first row in the table shows the time to candidacy of students 
who first entered the Ph.D. program between 1982 and 1985. The results show that for 
these pre-GEI cohorts, the students enrolled in GEI departments would advance to 
candidacy about one half year quicker than students enrolled at control departments (2.86 
vs. 3.32 years for men and 3.02 vs. 3.45 years for women). The other rows in the first set 
of results report the average time to candidacy for the other time periods. 
The second set of results in table 4 provide the difference in time to candidacy 
between students who enrolled in the partial, majority, or post-GEI periods and students 
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who enrolled in the pre-GEI period. For example, the second row shows that men 
enrolled at control departments experienced an increase of .159 years in the average time 
to candidacy between the pre-GEI and majority-GEI periods, while men at GEI 
departments experienced a decrease of .292 years. The corresponding changes for women 
were a decrease of .122 years at control departments and a decrease of .166 years at GEI 
departments. 
The third set of results in table 4 provide the difference between the change in 
time to candidacy at GEI departments that occurred between two periods with the change 
that occurred at control departments over the same time period. The table shows that men 
enrolled in GEI departments experienced a relative decrease of .451 years in the average 
time to candidacy between the majority-GEI and pre-GEI periods, while women enrolled 
in GEI departments experienced a relative decrease of only .044 years. These results are 
descriptive in nature but mimic the difference in difference estimation strategy used in 
the next section. 
 
Empirical Strategy and Results 
 The impact of the GEI is estimated using the difference between the change in 
time to candidacy at GEI departments and the change in time to candidacy at control 
schools: 
 Impact    = [Change in TTC at GEI depts.] – [Change in TTC at control depts.] 
     =  [ Ymajority, GEI  - Ypre, GEI] – [Ymajority, control - Ypre, control]     (1) 
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where Y is the time the student takes to advance to candidacy. The change at control 
departments captures the national level changes that would have likely influenced the 
GEI departments in the absence of the program. 
 The impact of the GEI can be estimated empirically using the following 
regression model: 
εγββββ +⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+= ∑∑
==
XGEIperiodGEIperiodY
j
jj
j
jj
4
2
32
4
2
10  (2) 
where period refers to the time period in which the student entered graduate school (such 
as pre, partial, majority, and post).  
 Plugging in corresponding regression coefficients from equation (2) into equation 
(1) provides the following estimator for the impact of the program between the pre-GEI 
and the majority-GEI period: 
  Impact = [ (β0 + β13 + β2 + β33) – (β0 + β2) ] – [ (β0 + β13) – (β0)] 
   = β33 
 
 The model in equation (2) is estimated separately by gender and the results are 
shown in table 5. The first two columns do not include controls for individual 
characteristics (prior masters degree, gre scores, race) while the second set of columns 
do. The point estimates that come from running the regressions separately by gender and 
are identical with those obtained using a pooled regression and interacting gender with all 
of the independent variables. The loss in precision of the standard errors is extremely 
small and so the regressions are run separately for the sake of clarity. Following the 
suggestion of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), standard errors are clustered at 
the cohort level (department/entering year). 
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 The results show that the GEI decreased time to candidacy for men by .47 years 
and had no effect on women. The impact of competition on men drops to .27 years when 
individual characteristics are controlled for but is still significant and represents a 10% 
decrease in the time to advance to candidacy.5 
The second question I address is whether the response to competition by men and 
women differs based on the fraction of the cohort that is female. To answer this question, 
I interact the time period and treatment variable with measures of the fraction of a 
student’s cohort that is female: 
εγββ
βββββ
+⋅+⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+=
∑
∑∑
=
==
XfemalefractionGEIperiodfemalefractionGEI
femalefractionGEIperiodGEIperiodY
j
jj
j
jj
j
jj
4
2
65
4
4
2
32
4
2
10
 
The variable fraction female is a measure of the fraction of a student’s entering cohort 
that is female and is measured two ways. The first is a set of three indicators for whether 
female students make up fewer than 40% of the cohort (male-dominant), between 40 and 
60% of the cohort (equally balanced), or more than 60% of the cohort (female-dominant). 
The second is a continuous measure of the fraction of the entering cohort that is female. 
The coefficient of interest is β63 which comes from the interaction of being in a 
department that participated in the GEI, entering graduate school during the majority-GEI 
                                                 
5
 One concern in this analysis is that the GEI may have had a different impact on the attrition rates of men 
and women. For the majority-GEI group there was no significant change for men or women though the 
point estimate for men was more negative. For the post-GEI group men experienced a 6 percentage point 
decrease in attrition, while women experienced an insignificant increase of 2.7 percentage points. These 
findings would indicate that the results in this section understate the gender difference in response to the 
program since the male students that were prevented from dropping out are likely of a lower quality and as 
a result increased the time to candidacy of the men in the treatment sample. 
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time period, and the fraction of the entering cohort that is female. The analysis is 
restricted to cohorts with at least 10 students. 
 The results in the upper panel of table 6 show that impact of competition on the 
performance of men is greatest in departments in which there is a larger fraction of 
female students with no significant impact in cohorts that are have fewer than 40% of the 
cohort being female. These results are consistent with the findings of Antonovics et al. 
(2005) that men perform better when more of their competitors are female. For women, 
the results indicate that there may be a slightly positive effect of competition in cohorts 
with a large fraction of students being women and a negative impact in male-dominant 
cohorts, though these results are only significant at the 10% level. The results in the 
lower panel in table 6 confirm the pattern of the non-linear effects that both and women 
have a more positive response to competition when a larger fraction of their peers are 
women. 
 A final question is whether the difference in the response of men and women to 
competition depends on their marital status. Marriage (and the children that often 
accompany it) provides incentives for students to use their time more effectively and puts 
married students under a tighter time constraint. Thus when competition is introduced, it 
is possible that married students have less excess capacity with which to increase effort 
and thus induces a smaller response. 
 Table 7 provides the same analysis as earlier but with the students separated by 
both gender and marital status at the start of graduate school. The results show that the 
only group that experienced a significant change in time to candidacy was single men 
who experienced a decrease of .20 years. Although not statistically significant, the GEI 
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appears to have increased the time to candidacy of married women by .37 years. For both 
men and women, the GEI appears to have had a more positive effect (or less negative 
effect) on single students than married students.  
  
Conclusion 
 The results in this paper show that men experienced a 10% decrease in time to 
candidacy in response to the introduction of the GEI, a competitive fellowship program, 
while women experienced no change, on average. Both men and women responded in a 
more positive way to the program when a larger fraction of their group was female. The 
results also suggest that the introduction of competition has a more positive impact on 
single students than married students. 
 These results indicate that when devising an incentive scheme for graduate 
students (and perhaps other work-related settings), there is an inherent tradeoff between 
increasing aggregate outcomes through the use of competition and achieving gender 
equity. By increasing the level of competition within a group, the average performance 
will increase but so may the gap in achievement between men and women. Future 
research might explore the degree to which the level of competition affects the gender 
wage gap within a particular occupation or industry.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics by gender 
 
Student Characteristics: Women Men 
Women=Men 
(t-stat) 
master’s degree prior to entry 0.203 0.234 3.68 
GRE verbal score 670.5 671.3 0.48 
GRE math score 616.6 647.0 16.54 
married at start of grad school 0.185 0.232 4.95 
age at start of grad school 25.86 25.93 0.56 
foreign student 0.132 0.179 6.32 
minority student 0.122 0.095 4.31 
non-minority student 0.640 0.613 2.74 
time to candidacy 3.021 2.856 7.52 
enrolled in Mellon department 0.656 0.656 0.02 
 
   
Started program: 
   
pre (1982-85) 0.228 0.245 1.93 
partial (1986-88) 0.227 0.224 0.38 
majority (1989-90) 0.170 0.159 1.44 
post (1991-95) 0.375 0.372 0.26 
    
Field: 
   
English 0.282 0.176 12.47 
political science 0.107 0.197 12.22 
history 0.230 0.288 6.42 
other 0.381 0.339 4.21 
   
 
Department:   
 
entering cohort size 15.85 16.50 3.36 
fraction Female 0.535 0.411 36.79 
N 4,528 5,136  
 
Notes: Bolded elements indicate a significant difference between men and women at the 
5% level.
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Table 2. Funding levels, GEI awards, and time to candidacy for students 
who entered GEI departments in 1987-1988. 
 
 Students who did not receive 
a GEI-award in 1991 
Students who received a 
GEI-award in 1991 
1990 stipend 
 includes RA, TA, and 
fellowship funding 
 
$5,948 
($5,145) 
 
 
$6,367 
($4,594) 
 
 
1991 stipend 
 includes RA, TA, and 
fellowship funding, as 
well as GEI award 
 
$5,748 
($5,559) 
 
 
 
$10,442 
($3,408) 
 
 
 
1991 GEI award 
 included in 1991 stipend 
 
$0 $7,689 
($3,937) 
Mean time to candidacy 
 
2.977 years 
(1.397) 
 
2.475 years 
(.718) 
Percentage who advanced 
to candidacy in less than 3 
years 
56.1% 78.6% 
Observations 
[fraction of sample] 
1,688 
[91.6%] 
154 
[8.4%] 
 
Notes: The sample for this table are all of these students who enrolled in one of the GEI-
departments between 1987 and 1988. All monetary values are expressed in terms of 1988 
dollars. The difference in 1990 stipend level is not statistically different between the two 
groups (t-stat=.957). All other differences are significant at the 1% level. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Cohort size and fraction of students who are female. 
 
Field 
cohort 
size 
fraction 
female 
Percentiles for fraction female: 
     10th        25th          50th            75th          90th 
Anthropology 10.13 0.573 0.333 0.500 0.590 0.667 0.765 
Art 8.99 0.664 0.500 0.500 0.667 0.750 0.833 
Classics 5.30 0.449 0.250 0.286 0.423 0.600 0.714 
Comp. literature 8.11 0.579 0.333 0.444 0.571 0.680 0.800 
English 20.53 0.594 0.405 0.508 0.598 0.667 0.760 
History 25.41 0.438 0.296 0.368 0.444 0.526 0.600 
Music 8.87 0.409 0.176 0.286 0.400 0.500 0.667 
Philosophy 8.11 0.299 0.125 0.222 0.286 0.400 0.500 
Political science 18.21 0.345 0.200 0.267 0.333 0.429 0.514 
Religion 8.08 0.427 0.200 0.273 0.429 0.600 0.667 
Sample 13.57 0.488 0.250 0.333 0.500 0.625 0.740 
 
Notes: Cohort size refers to the number of students that enter a specific department in a 
particular year. Fraction female refers to the fraction of students in each field that are 
female. The percentiles report the fraction of students that are female in the cohort that is 
the Xth percentile in terms of fraction of students being female. 
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Table 4. Average Time to candidacy by treatment, gender, and time period 
 
 Men Women 
Started program: Control GEI Control GEI 
1982-85  (pre) 3.320 2.856 3.449 3.024 
1986-88 (partial) 3.494 2.672 3.501 2.854 
1989-90 (majority) 3.479 2.564 3.327 2.858 
1991-95  (post) 3.271 2.630 3.319 2.780 
     
Difference     
partial  -  pre 0.174 -0.184 0.052 -0.170 
majority  -  pre 0.159 -0.292 -0.122 -0.166 
post  -  pre -0.049 -0.226 -0.130 -0.244 
     
Difference in Difference: 
∆GEI -  ∆Control     
∆=(partial  -  pre)  -0.358  -0.222 
∆=(majority  -  pre)  -0.451  -0.044 
∆=(post  -  pre)  -0.177  -0.114 
 
Notes: GEI refers to students who enrolled in a department that participated in the GEI. 
“Pre” refers to students who were never eligible for a GEI award at any point in graduate 
school. The majority group is the focus for this study since they were the students who 
were enrolled but had not yet advanced to candidacy when the program was implemented 
in 1991. 
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Table 5. Impact of GEI on time to candidacy by gender 
 
 women men women men 
pre    --   --   --   -- 
     
partial 0.097 0.186 0.003 -0.028 
 [0.157] [0.133] [0.085] [0.078] 
majority -0.132 0.186 -0.265** -0.016 
 [0.157] [0.131] [0.093] [0.080] 
post -0.127 -0.027 -0.277** -0.136 
 [0.126] [0.114] [0.078] [0.071] 
GEI -0.376** -0.438** 0.160 0.220** 
 [0.129] [0.131] [0.096] [0.082] 
GEI·partial -0.273 -0.357* -0.177 -0.131 
 [0.192] [0.180] [0.109] [0.101] 
GEI·majority -0.028 -0.474* 0.094 -0.269* 
 [0.194] [0.189] [0.120] [0.106] 
GEI·post -0.122 -0.186 -0.005 -0.131 
 [0.159] [0.157] [0.100] [0.092] 
cohort size   -0.005* -0.006** 
   [0.002] [0.002] 
masters degree   -0.336** -0.343** 
   [0.043] [0.037] 
GRE verbal score   0.009 -0.022 
   [0.018] [0.015] 
GRE math score   -0.052** -0.021 
   [0.016] [0.014] 
foreign student   -0.123** -0.096** 
   [0.044] [0.033] 
minority student   0.076* 0.101* 
   [0.039] [0.041] 
constant 3.389** 3.243** 3.152** 3.006** 
 [0.108] [0.094] [0.184] [0.169] 
N 4,528 5,136 4,528 5,136 
R2 0.05 0.09 0.39 0.44 
 
 Notes:  Pre, partial, majority, and post refer to the year the student entered graduate 
school. GEI indicates the student was enrolled in a department that participated in the 
program. The model also includes controls for field and institution. Standard errors are 
clustered to account for general autocorrelation among errors across students within the 
same cohort (department/entering year). We use asterisks to denote statistical 
significance as follows: *statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the.01 level.
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Table 6. Impact of GEI on time to candidacy by student gender and gender 
mix of cohort  
 
Non-linear Effect women men women=men 
(t-stat) 
 
(GEI · majority) interacted with: 
 
   
male dominant 0.399 -0.043 1.70* 
 [0.311] [0.194] 
 
 
equally balanced 0.252 -0.346 2.72** 
 [0.220] [0.184] 
 
 
female dominant -0.261 -0.997** 2.25* 
 [0.207] [0.313]  
    
N 3,576 4,057  
R2 0.42 0.46  
    
    
Linear Effect    
 
(GEI · majority) interacted with: 
   
    
fraction of cohort that is female -1.82* -1.64* 0.19 
 [0.867] [0.649]  
    
N 3,576 4,057  
R2 0.41 0.46  
    
 
Note: The test statistic is based on a pooled regression and involves testing for a 
difference in the interaction between female and the coefficient listed. Each model 
includes all the variables from the right two columns in table 5 including field and 
institution controls. Each model also includes the main effects for male dominant, equally 
balanced, and female dominants along with their interaction with partial, post, and GEI. 
The analysis is limited to cohorts with at least 10 students. We use asterisks to denote 
statistical significance as follows: *statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the.01 
level. 
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 Table 7. Impact of GEI on time to candidacy by gender and marital status 
 
 Single men Married men Single women Married women 
partial -0.086 -0.142 0.035 -0.001 
 [0.094] [0.137] [0.099] [0.179] 
majority -0.062 -0.068 -0.259* -0.462* 
 [0.096] [0.144] [0.110] [0.190] 
post -0.176* -0.169 -0.287** -0.198 
 [0.088] [0.137] [0.093] [0.160] 
GEI 0.136 0.133 0.101 0.153 
 [0.104] [0.155] [0.113] [0.194] 
GEI·partial -0.037 -0.107 -0.207 -0.098 
 [0.122] [0.167] [0.124] [0.215] 
GEI·majority -0.204 -0.118 0.081 0.373 
 [0.128] [0.190] [0.136] [0.243] 
GEI·post -0.104 0.047 0.006 -0.086 
 [0.113] [0.164] [0.114] [0.197] 
constant 3.179** 2.774** 3.498** 2.864** 
 [0.217] [0.331] [0.232] [0.419] 
N 2,959 894 2,883 655 
R2 0.48 0.39 0.41 0.39 
 
Notes: The measure of marriage here is based on the student’s marital status at the start of 
graduate school and does not account for students who get married during graduate 
school. We use asterisks to denote statistical significance as follows: *statistically 
significant at the .05 level; **at the.01 level. 
 
